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Abstract
　　This article is the first in a series examining Japan's aid relations. It discusses the his-
tory and motivations behind ODA and the role of ‘aid with a face’, suggesting that this 
may play an important role. Japan's presence in Tonga is examined, and the impressions of 
various aid actors discussed. Within Tonga at least, Japan's aid is largely benign and has 
left a positive image of Japan with Tongans.
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1.　Introduction
　　Historically, Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been seen as a major aspect 
of Japanese foreign policy. Japan's Constitutional abandonment of military force limits the 
tools it has to project itself on the international stage. As the world's second largest econo-
my and Japan's own experience as a developing country, ODA has been given a great deal 
of emphasis. However, it has been criticised as being too politicised, for serving the inter-
ests of the Japanese economy more than the recipient's and for inefficiency1. In addition, it 
has been criticised for lacking focus and a guiding principle, ignoring human rights and 
environmental issues, lacking flexibility and concentrating on Japan's relatively rich East 
Asian neighbours. In recent years moves have been made to address these criticisms, 
chiefly through the ODA Charter, Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Proj-
ects and rationalisation of the ODA procedures and bodies. Japan's ODA can be measured 
in a variety of ways. In absolute terms, Japan is the second largest donor in the world after 
the USA. However, this masks several disparities: Japan's 2005 ODA total of US$13.1 bil-
lion falls far behind the US's US$27.46 billion, which is only 0.28% of Japan's GNI (Gross 
National Income), sixth lowest of the 23 DAC (Development Cooperation Directorate) 
members and well below the UN target of 0.7% of GNI (OECD, 2006). Despite these sta-
tistical failings, the potential impact of Japan's ODA cannot be denied.
　　This paper is part of a wider study examining Japan's efforts to address the problems 
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arising from the changing development environment and the role Japan plays within it. 
This particular article examines Japan's ODA relations with Tonga and how these are per-
ceived. Tonga is unique in the South Pacific in having not been completely absorbed by 
the British or any other empire in the 19th Century, the royal family having managed to 
maintain its position throughout the period. It is otherwise an average South Pacific island 
nation, endeavouring to overcome the problems it faces as a small, isolated country lack-
ing significant natural or strategic resources. It has been a recipient of aid from Japan since 
the 1970s and has good trade and cultural relations with Japan. Recent events (November, 
2006) have put Tonga's otherwise peaceful burgeoning pro-democracy movement in the 
news, the riots possibly being a consequence of other animosities (The Age, 2006a). How-
ever, these events post-date the research and are largely extraneous to the following dis-
cussion. An examination of Japan's ODA will be followed by a discussion of the field re-
search carried out in Tonga in August 2006.
2.　Japan and ODA
2.1　A Brief History of Japanese ODA
　　Japan's first experience with development was in the immediate post-War period, re-
covering from the devastation of war. Japan's role as a major supplier to the US military 
during the Korean War, and US support for market-protection measures, as well as govern-
ment-directed investment and planning led to Japan's economic recovery. This has been 
seen as an ideal model for economic development for many other countries; as will be dis-
cussed below, Japan sees itself as being in an ideal position to give assistance, as it is the 
only aid donor that has any recent experience of development.
　　In 1954 Japan joined the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Devel-
opment in Asia and the Pacific. The financial assistance it gave under this plan was seen as 
an extension of postwar reparations. This rather ambiguous start meant there was very lit-
tle in the way of a philosophy behind how the aid was directed. Japan pushed for an Asian 
development fund similar to the Marshall Plan, but it was not until 1966 that the USA (en-
tangled in the conflict in Vietnam) agreed to jointly found and fund the Asian Develop-
ment Bank. In the 1970s, under the 'Fukuda Doctrine' of greater cooperation with the As-
sociation of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Prime Minister Fukuda pledged US$4 
billion to five ASEAN regional economic development projects. This and other Japanese 
ODA filled the void created by the US defeat in Vietnam and subsequent withdrawal from 
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the region as a whole (Iokibe, 2003). Furthermore, Fukuda committed Japan to the first of 
a series of aid doubling plans. In the late 1980s, and as Japan's economy expanded expo-
nentially, Prime Minister Takeshita announced US$50 billion in ODA over five years as 
part of his international cooperation initiative (Yasutomo, 1990, p.491), combining it with 
cultural exchange and non-military contributions to peace-keeping efforts as central to 
Japanese diplomacy (Yasutomo, 1990, p.498). In 1992, the Foreign Ministry published the 
first ODA Charter, explicitly laying down for the first time Japan's ODA philosophy, 
guidelines and priorities. It has been reviewed several times to take account of the chang-
ing international and domestic environments.
　　The new century and the post-September 11th era has brought about a change in em-
phasis, coinciding with changes in domestic politics. Following on from earlier initiatives, 
Prime Minister Koizumi has dispatched the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to partic-
ipate in UN peace-keeping operations. He has committed Japan to President Bush's ‘war 
on terror’, including a $500 million contribution over two and a half years to Afghanistan's 
reconstruction (Koizumi, 2002). This more active role, while controversial, is seen as 
more dynamic and positive than the ‘cheque book diplomacy’ of the past. In 2003 the 
ODA Charter was reviewed to include security issues and clarify some other aspects (see 
below for a fuller discussion). By 2009 two of the main ODA agencies, JBIC and JICA, 
will be fully merged as part of a major rationalisation programme (Wakasugi, 2006).
2.2　Models of Japanese ODA
　　There is a wide-ranging debate surrounding the factors behind Japanese aid policy 
making. Various models have been presented, most analysts suggesting a combination of 
factors with their preferred model taking the dominant role in most cases.
　　The first model is gaiatsu: external pressure from its strategic and diplomatic part-
ners, in particular the United States (Yasutomo, 1990; Tuman & Ayoub, 2004; Tuman & 
Strand, 2006). ODA can be seen as facilitating relations with the US and supporting its 
strategic interests. Pro-US regimes and programmes supported by the US (such as struc-
tural adjustment programmes) are given Japanese support and financial backing. Tuman 
and Ayoub (2004) suggest that, in Africa at least, certain US military-strategic interests 
guide the flow of Japanese ODA. Japanese ODA is seen as “reactive” and a “resource to 
help the US … maintain openness and stability… [which] safeguards the interests of Japa-
nese multinational firms” (Tuman & Strand, 2006, p.63-64), either through access to world 
markets or to US markets. ODA given in support of US interests was additionally seen as 
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a means of easing tensions between the US and Japan - the ODA doubling programmes of 
the 1980s were seen as a response to increasing anti-Japanese sentiment in the US (‘Japan-
bashing’, anti-dumping laws, etc). More recently, Japan has given a great deal of financial 
(and personnel) support to America's ‘war on terror’.
　　Another approach is to assume a high degree of idealism and humanitarianism in-
forming policy making. Throughout, Japan has insisted on its aid not being used for mili-
tary purposes, directly and wherever possible indirectly. Japan has withdrawn aid in cases 
where it might be seen as supporting a repressive military regime, such as in 1991 after the 
military coup in Haiti and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (at the time, Zaire; 
most aid has still been suspended). Similarly, aid was suspended in the following year to 
Sudan. In 1992 Japan's first postwar sortie out into the world was to send a small contin-
gent of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to Cambodia to help with the elections under the 
auspices of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia [Okuizumi, 1995]). Financial and 
technical aid has been given to help with natural disasters throughout the world, such as to 
earthquakes around the world and to those countries affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami. However, as critics point out, the initiative was often taken and led by other do-
nor countries or the UN.
　　A third model gives domestic politics and national interest a leading role in determin-
ing aid policy: a combination of public opinion and the policy making “triad” or “iron tri-
angle” of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the bureaucracy and business (Sato, 2001, 
p.14). However, the triad is not monolithic and each is fractured into competing parts that 
are eager to push their position and defend their territory. This is apparent throughout Japa-
nese foreign policy (see Sato, 2001) and in ODA policy can be seen in the diverse minis-
tries involved in aid dispersal. It is often blamed for the sometimes slow response to for-
eign policy crises.
　　Sunaga (2004, pp.10-11) argues that there are three groups defining national interest 
in relation to ODA. The first focuses on the development needs of recipient countries and 
policy should ignore domestic politics, as this selfless position would ensure Japan's inter-
national standing and interests in the long run. A second group calls for a more strategic 
use of ODA, emphasising bilateral aid and cutting back on multilateral aid, especially to 
organisations where Japan's views are underrepresented or ignored; in addition, they argue 
that Japan should be more active in peace building as politically stable countries are in Ja-
pan's interests. The third and smallest group takes this position to a more extreme level, ar-
guing that aid should be used (or withheld) as a direct tool of foreign policy where returns 
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are clear.2
　　Most writers suggest that all three models play their part in shaping aid policy. As the 
above examples indicate, each comes to the fore depending on the circumstances.3 All 
three models can be seen manifesting themselves in the Official Development Assistance 
Charter.
2.3　2003 ODA Charter
　　During the 1980s, Japan came under increasing criticism for its unfocused approach 
to aid disbursement and its use of ODA as a political tool - ‘cheque book diplomacy’. At 
the same time, there was an growing on-going international debate on the role and use of 
development assistance which provided a source of inspiration and direction to Japanese 
aid policymakers. The first Official Development Assistance Charter was published in 
1992 and has been through several revisions that have addressed unforeseen problems and 
changing circumstances. The latest revision was in 2003. The Charter sets out several pri-
ority issues, principles, basic policies and objectives, as well as guidelines on formulation 
and implementation. The Charter opens by stating that the underlying motive behind ODA 
is to “ensure Japan's own security and prosperity” through a stable and peaceful interna-
tional community (MOFA, 2003, p.1). This is a change from earlier versions, but Sunaga 
(2004, p.9) argues that this is just an acceptance of reality and in line with many other do-
nors. Major themes running through the document are democratization, security issues and 
‘human security’. The Charter is very much concerned with the ownership of the develop-
ment process, placing emphasis on self-help, local initiative, democracy and good gover-
nance.
　　The region given priority as a recipient of Japanese aid is Asia as it has a “major im-
pact on Japan's stability and prosperity” (MOFA, 2003, p.6). Aid is to be used to strength-
en relations and is explicitly stated to be ‘strategic’. This smacks of real politick, but the 
Charter tempers it with a sensitivity to cultural differences and changing needs. All other 
regions are mentioned, and Japan's role in stabilizing countries and regions embroiled in 
conflict is repeatedly mentioned.
　　The underlying objectives are given as addressing humanitarian issues such as pover-
ty, famine, natural disasters, sustainable development, etc (encapsulated under the term 
human security) and also tackling terrorism through peace building, democratisation and 
political stabilisation. Clearly, this is a post-September 11th addition.
　　These objectives are reinforced by the Principles of Implementation (MOFA, 2003, 
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pp.7-8) which have remained largely unchanged through all versions of the Charter. These 
are protection of the environment; non-military use of Japanese aid; the recipient's military 
spending; and promotion of democracy and market economics. The second and third are in 
line with the Japanese Constitution that restricts Japan's military, and is in accordance with 
Japan's self image as a pacifist country.
　　A major addition to the revised Charter is cooperation with other donors, and with re-
gional organisations and NGOs. This is in contrast to Japan's traditional emphasis on bilat-
eral aid, but is a response to critics and in line with the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) which call for greater cooperation between aid actors and coordination of aid pro-
grammes. Japan sees itself as being in a unique position of being both a recipient and a do-
nor of aid. This experience has directed the kind of aid and the projects chosen (Sunaga, 
2004, p.16). At the same time, Japanese aid practitioners believe that Japan is both a more 
sympathetic donor and a model for many developing countries (most explicitly stated by 
Inagaki, 2006), a sentiment echoed by some recipients (discussed in more detail below). 
By overly coordinating aid, it is worried by some Japanese policy makers (Iimura, 2001, 
p.54) that developing countries will be given a standardised, one-size-fits-all development 
package, and will be unable to benefit from the different development experiences of each 
donor. This dichotomy runs throughout Japan's aid policy and relations.
　　A key component of the Charter is the role of self-help, including the inclusion of 
women and the socially vulnerable in the development process (MOFA, 2003, pp.2-3). 
The 2003 revision links self-help with good governance, but Sunaga (2004, pp.13-14) ar-
gues that Japan is “less inclined to articulate such a policy” than other members of the aid 
community as it suggests an involvement in the internal politics of recipients. At the same 
time, the ‘request-first principle’ present in earlier versions has been dropped. This was 
seen as a central tenet of self-help, allowing recipients to set their own development priori-
ties. However, this only means that approval of requests will require more rigorous policy 
discussion (ibid.). Ownership of the process has always been central to Japan's ODA. This 
essentially means that Japan supports the recipient taking the lead in designing and imple-
menting their own development plan and is one aspect of the fourth Principle of ODA Im-
plementation - democratization, market-oriented economies and human rights.
2.4　‘Aid with a face’
　　The semi-official JICA slogan is ‘aid with a face’ (Iimura, 2001; Inagaki, 2006; Suna-
ga, 2004, p.11). This serves two functions. Firstly, it is to broaden support for ODA spend-
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ing within Japan by highlighting how the money is used and increase the number of people 
involved in the aid process as volunteers (Iimura, 2001, p.51). This was a response to a fall 
in public support for ODA due to the slow economy of the 1990s, and the belief that aid 
was being used for purely economic and political reasons, and was ineffective (Sunaga, 
2004., p.4). This has included reproducing the popular Japan Overseas Cooperation Volun-
teers (JOCV) programme for older people who wish to share their skills and experience. 
The Senior Volunteer (SV) programme (originally Senior Cooperation Experts) was started 
in 1990 and by 2004, 2,280 volunteers aged 40 to 69 had been dispatched around the 
world (MOFA, 2005).
　　The second function of ‘aid with a face’ is to promote Japan's image in recipient 
countries. As the Charter puts it, wider knowledge of Japan's efforts to help with the de-
velopment of its neighbours and trade partners, “both at home and abroad is the most suit-
able policy for gaining sympathy and support from the international community for Japan's 
position [of aspiring for world peace].” (MOFA, 2003, p.2) This includes the use of volun-
teers and increasing their profile in local communities, and attaching the Japanese flag to 
the hardware of aid projects - literally “flying the flag” (Iimura, 2001, p.52). This is evi-
dently an attempt to promote Japan's image amongst the general public in recipient coun-
tries. This goes against the trend amongst other donors (although, in Tonga and Fiji at 
least, aid agencies are not shy of attaching their name to all the hardware they provide) 
and harks back to a less cooperative era when aid was used to promote national interests. 
However, it is in part the price that has to be paid in exchange for domestic public support. 
As Japan harmonises its aid with other countries under the MDGs, this will become in-
creasingly difficult (Sunaga, 2004, p.17). ‘Aid with a face’ falls broadly under the third 
model discussed above - domestic politics shaping aid policy as suggested by Sato (2001). 
It would also be a policy approach most suited to Sunaga's (2004) second group that calls 
for the strategic use of aid. Iimura (2001), the Director-General of the Economic-Coopera-
tion Bureau in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of his writing, is an 
outspoken advocate of ‘aid with a face’ and the need to fly the flag.
3.　A Case Study: Japan's ODA in Tonga
3.1　Why Tonga?
　　Tonga is a small and, for Japan, geo-strategically insignificant country. It was, until 
recently (The Age, 2006a) politically stable, has no key mineral resources or other eco-
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nomically sought-after attributes. While plainly a developing country in need of assistance, 
it is not in extreme poverty or suffering any major natural or other threat. Although it gave 
full support to the Allies in World War Two, it was not invaded by Japan nor saw any ma-
jor action. In all, this is a good test case for Japan's ODA policy as there are no extenuating 
political, economic or historical circumstances that could influence Japan's motivation.
　　At the same time, although the amount of aid given is not huge in absolute terms, be-
cause of the small size of the population the impact it does have can be felt more widely 
throughout society. This can be more easily understood when compared to larger aid pack-
ages in a country such as, for example, Indonesia where only a relatively small part of the 
economy and population will be affected.
　　Research in Tonga was carried out over a two-week period in August 2006. Unfortu-
nately, during this period the King of Tonga fell into a coma and shortly after died, which 
meant that many people were rather distracted or unavailable for interview. That said, in-
terviewees included journalists, JICA officials, a government minister and the Director of 
the Central Planning Agency (which coordinates much of the aid entering the country), as 
well as more informal interviews with ‘regular’ Tongans and non-Tongan residents. Addi-
tional interviews were carried out with Fiji-based Professor Robertson of the University of 
the South Pacific, the Pacific Islands Forum and officials from the JICA regional head of-
fice in Suva, Fiji.
3.2　Japan and Tonga's Aid Relations
　　In the Pacific, Japan is the second largest donor of aid after Australia and is the larg-
est export market for Tonga's main export, squash (MOFA, 2006). Japan sent the first 
JOCV group in 1973 and started giving bilateral grant aid to Tonga in 1977. JICA arrived 
in 1978 (four years after it was established) which became the main conduit of ODA (Gen-
eral Grant Aid). Between 1977 and 2004 a total of twenty-nine projects, ranging from 6 
million yen to over 1 billion yen, to total 11.68 billion yen (approximately US$100 mil-
lion) (compiled from JICA, 2006, pp.90-91). These include fisheries-related and port facil-
ities projects, school construction, coastal protection, construction of roads, construction 
of a new terminal at the international airport, water supply projects, building a culture cen-
tre and, most recently, upgrading and refurbishing of the central hospital. Between 1995 
and 2004 there have been 147 Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects 
(GGP; discussed in more detail below) totalling US$3,877,000, ranging from US$5,500 to 
US$82,000 each. The main categories are health and education (compiled from ibid. 
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pp.107-108).
　　Between 1974 and 2005 about 250 Tongan citizens received training under the JICA 
Training Programme in Japan (about 0.2% of the population). Between 1994 and 2004 fif-
teen JICA technical experts visited Tonga, staying for a couple of months up to three 
years, almost half in the field of fisheries development (ibid. p.31). Over the same period 
there have been 277 JOC Volunteers dispatched to Tonga, mostly in the field of education 
(including Japanese language teaching) for a two year period (pp.62-63). Senior Volun-
teers stay for one to two years each, but some extend for another two years if their situa-
tion allows it and if they want to continue their service. The 24 SVs that have been based 
in Tonga since the programme was first set up in Tonga in 2000 have worked in a wide va-
riety of technical fields (p.75). For the South Pacific as a whole, the volunteer programme 
is a major expenditure, taking up almost 44% of JICA's regional budget, much higher than 
other regions (Wakasugi, 2006), highlighting the importance given to this aspect of ODA 
to the region.
3.3　Japanese ODA in Tonga: Views and Issues
　　The following discussion will show that, amongst Tongans at least, the public rela-
tions objectives of ‘aid with a face’ can be considered largely successful. At the same time, 
we will consider how the Charter has been applied to the case of Tonga. A major problem 
with interviews is that interviewees will often provide answers that they believe will satis-
fy the interviewer. This often means that the interviewer must accept the information gath-
ered with a pinch of salt. We tried to overcome this by asking wide-ranging and open-end-
ed questions that allowed the interviewees to express their views on a variety of issues, 
making comparisons with other donors and programmes. The downside of this is that the 
interview often went in unplanned directions and certain questions went unanswered. 
However, most interviewees expressed themselves candidly once the interview was prop-
erly underway. Firstly, we will give a brief overview of the different categories of inter-
viewees followed by a discussion of some issues that came up during the field research.
3.3.1　Aid Practitioners
　　Three formal interviews were carried out with members of JICA, as well as more in-
formal, conversational interviews with several others. Two of the formal interviews were 
carried out at JICA regional head office in Fiji with Project supervisors, the third in 
Nuku'alofa, Tonga, with the JICA Resident Representative. The informal interviews were 
with JICA volunteers, both JOCV and Senior Volunteers.
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　　These groups had two different experiences of ODA and, although there was a certain 
overlap, expressed different views. The first group was more willing to acknowledge the 
implicit political aspects of ODA. In particular, the emphasis on bilateral aid relations was 
seen as a diplomatic tool that in part put an obligation on the recipient - ongaeshi - the ob-
ligation to return a favour or kindness (Wakasugi, 2006). The various aspects of ‘aid with 
a face’ were fully understood, in particular by the Resident Representative, Inagaki (2006), 
the senior JICA officer interviewed. At the same time, however, this group believed that 
Japan had altruistic humanitarian reasons for giving aid to the region, and that their efforts 
were well-meant and effective.
　　The various volunteers were all very sincere about their work in Tonga, although 
some admitted that they believed they had little impact or contribution to Tongan develop-
ment. Participating in the volunteer programme evidently had as much to do with personal 
development and experience as selfless altruism or a desire to help. The SVs in particular 
mentioned the “propaganda” (“senden”) aspects of ODA and the role it played in stabilis-
ing the region.
3.3.2　Tongan Interviewees
　　Interviews were carried out with the Minister of Transport (Karalus, 2006) and the 
Director of Central Planning (Fusimalohi, 2006). Both were very knowledgeable, although 
the Minister in particular was understandably less candid in his comments than any of 
those interviewed. However, both were willing to both praise and criticise different aspects 
of Japanese aid. They perceived aid as a part of Tonga's political relations with Japan and 
they fully accepted any obligation Tonga had, but believed that Tonga had the right to de-
cide how this obligation would be paid back. It was remarked that occasionally ODA 
would be explicitly linked to Japan's aspirations and Tonga's voting behaviour in interna-
tional bodies; but only informally and only by non-government aid-related officials (Fusi-
malohi, 2006).
　　Interviews were carried out with journalists from Radio Tonga and Matangi Tonga 
Online. It was suggested that Japanese aid was more “realistic” (Fonua, 2006) and that Ja-
pan less “condescending” and had less of a “colonial attitude” (Petelo, 2006) than other 
aid donors.
　　Informal interviews were held with other Tongans and the general attitude was one of 
gratitude for the aid. Those who came into direct contact with Japanese volunteers often 
preferred them to their Australian and New Zealand counterparts, seeing greater cultural 
similarities between themselves and Japanese people (for example attitudes towards diffi-
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dence and clothing modesty). Those who had no or little contact saw the Japanese as quiet 
but friendly. Both groups were grateful for Japanese aid but did not rate it as any better or 
worse than any other country's aid.
3.3.3　Non-Tongan Residents and Other Interviewee
　　Non-Tongan residents fall into two categories - Japanese and non-Japanese. The for-
mer (and we were able to talk with two long-term residents) were obviously more positive 
about Japan's presence in Tonga and believed more should and could be done, although 
they believed that some of the aid had political strings attached. The latter group and other, 
shorter-term foreigners in Tonga were surprisingly hostile to Japanese aid. Australian vol-
unteers were quick to praise their Japanese counterparts individually but criticised Japa-
nese ODA overall. Almost all mentioned the whaling issue and access to fisheries (dis-
cussed below) and saw Japanese aid as largely political. When asked about the political 
aspects of Australian aid, they suggested that Australia was just being a good neighbour, or 
that politically and economically stable countries in the region were in Australia's interests 
- much the same reasons given by Japanese interviewees.
　　The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) criticised Japan's preference for bilateralism and 
project-specific funding rather than programme-specific (Sachs-Cornish, 2006). However, 
they were pleased with the fourth Japan-Pacific Islands Forum Summit Meeting (PALM; 
held in Okinawa every three years and most recently held in May 2006) in which Japan 
pledged to increase funding and improve follow-up assessment measures. Furthermore, 
Japan moved closer to working with regional bodies, but still expressed a preference for 
working bilaterally.
3.3.4　Fisheries and the Whaling Issue
　　Almost all the interviewees brought up the fishing industry. Three of the first five 
projects funded by Japanese grant aid were fisheries development related (JICA, 2006, 
p.90). However, since these projects there have been only two more. Currently, none of the 
JICA experts or volunteers are working in fisheries related industries. Although Japanese 
fishing fleets operate in Tongan waters (under a treaty) very little or no processing occurs 
in Tonga.
　　Coincidently, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) was held in June 2006. 
Japan and other pro-whaling countries were able to win a resolution criticising the morato-
rium on commercial whaling, a vote won by a single vote (Guardian, 2006). Japan came 
under heavy criticism for ‘cheque book diplomacy’ as many of those countries supporting 
the resolution were recipients of generous Japanese aid, including several from the Pacific 
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region. However, Tonga was not one of these and it's official policy is to ban whaling, al-
though there have been attempts to change this and even the Prime Minister is not against 
limited whaling (Matangi, 2006a). It was suggested by some of the Japanese interviewees 
that Tonga's position was the result of pressure from Australia and New Zealand. As men-
tioned above, many non-Japanese and non-Tongans brought up the issue of whaling, ap-
parently ignorant of the fact that Tonga is not an IWC member. Evidently, this aspect of 
Japan's foreign policy will always impact on perceptions of Japan's relations with other 
countries.4
3.3.5　China
　　China has recently raised its diplomatic presence in the region. This includes a recent 
pledge of over US$380 million (three billion yuan) in preferential loans (Matangi, 2006b) 
for the region as a whole. In Tonga they have built and furnished schools and, as a centre 
piece, a new conference centre for the Pacific Island Leaders Forum Meeting (which will 
be completed even though the conference for which it was intended has been cancelled 
[Matangi, 2006c]). There have been high level government visits, free twenty-four hour 
broadcasting of CCTV, China's English language satellite channel, and scholarships for 
journalism-related studies in China.
　　Typically the main target of China's diplomacy in the region has been Taiwan and the 
one-China policy, support for which is usually a condition of Chinese aid. However, as 
mentioned above, Japan pledged 45 billion yen over the next three years at the fourth 
PALM, a sum equal to just over US$380 million (Matangi, 2006a). Prime Minister Koizu-
mi stated that China was not seen as competition and that it's participation in the region's 
development was welcome. However, many of the interviewees expressed the opinion that 
they saw China as trying to replace Japan and win influence at Japan's expense. The gener-
al opinion was that the quality of Chinese aid was not as good as Japan's. In particular, 
construction did not use local companies or staff, and the equipment provided for the 
schools were not robust enough for the solidly built Tongan high school students (Inagaki, 
2006 and many Tongans). The lack of focus and heavy-handed nature of the Chinese aid is 
reminiscent of Japan of an earlier era.
3.3.6　Vaiola Hospital
　　Japan's most recent large scale project in Tonga is the on-going construction and re-
furbishing of the Vaiola hospital, jointly funded with the UN and other donors (Matangi, 
2006d). So far US$9.7 million of Japanese aid has been spent. Naturally, everybody is 
grateful for the improvement of the hospital, but many commented on the various prob-
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lems involved in its construction. These include the lack of coordination between the dif-
ferent donors (resulting in the different wings not having direct connecting passageways), 
disagreements between the Japanese and local contractors and several delays.
3.3.7　Ovalaha Ferry
　　Tonga is made up of three island groups, so transportation is an important issue. 
There are currently two privately-owned airlines linking the island groups, but most Ton-
gans have to use the inter-island ferries. There are two ferries serving the Tongan island 
group, one state-owned (the Ovalaha ferry) and one privately-owned. Both are old and not 
in the best condition. The Japanese government agreed to replace the Ovalaha ferry at the 
request of the Tongan government. However, a letter was sent to the Japanese embassy 
from a Tongan MP complaining about Japan's interference in private enterprise, suggesting 
that the replacement ferry would damage the business of the privately owned ferry, de-
scribing it as “cruel and unkind” (Tonga Broadcasting 2006). Japan's initial response was 
to withdraw its funding. The MP concerned also happened to be the owner of the private 
ferry and insists on being party to any discussions. The debate became increasingly politi-
cal, and Japan has still not decided to renew its funding. The MP concerned has come un-
der a great deal of criticism and is seen as holding inter-island communications to ransom, 
especially as his own ferry is often unable to run (Karalus, 2006).
　　Japan's response is very much in line with the Charter. As noted above, one of the 
central Principles is support for market-oriented economies, so an accusation of damaging 
an indigenous private business could lead to Japan being in an embarrassing position. It 
would furthermore suggest that Japan is interfering in local politics.
3.3.8　The Culture Centre, Airport and Road
　　Three major programmes that have had a huge impact on Tongan life have been con-
struction of the Tonga Culture and Handicrafts Centre (1986; over 5 hundred million yen), 
the Fua'amotu International Airport (1989-90; almost 14 hundred million yen) and a major 
road linking the airport to the capital city of Nuku'alofa (1995-6; almost 16 hundred mil-
lion yen) (JICA, 2006, p.90). In addition to being a source of tourism dollars, the Culture 
Centre has become a community focus independent of the many churches for the main is-
land, Tongatapu, and has led to a revival of interest in traditional cultural practices. The 
airport has improved links with the outside world, important for a country where the main 
source of income is remittances from Tongans working overseas (CIA, 2006). The road, 
which bisects the island, has meant travelling within the island has been made much easier. 
All of these were commented on and praised. Each of these are typical examples of tradi-
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tional Japanese, one-off project-based, construction-type aid. However, they would con-
form to the 2003 Charter because they used local construction firms, were requested by 
the Tongan government, and benefit Tongan economy and society.
3.3.9　Water and Waste Disposal
　　Japan has become a world leader in water and waste disposal projects, pioneering a 
cheap, low-tech highly effective solid waste processing technique. The Fukuoka method 
allows landfills to be constructed in an easy and environmentally friendly way, and made 
safe quickly. Japan has implemented this method throughout the region and elsewhere, and 
although waste disposal in Tonga comes under the remit of the Australian aid agency, they 
use a similar method (Suzuki, 2006).
　　Japan has given almost 15 hundred million yen in grant aid for water supply related 
projects (JICA, 2006, p.90). As will be mentioned below, Tongan villages are spotted with 
signboards displaying the Japanese flag proclaiming a Japanese funded water supply proj-
ect. For a country with few natural sources of fresh water, these projects without a doubt 
address this fundamental ‘human security’ issue.
3.3.10　Grant Assistance Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP)
　　As mentioned above, Japan has funded 147 Grassroots Projects over nine years at a 
cost of US$3,877,000 (JICA, 2006, pp.107-111). GGPs are a relatively new aid instrument 
aimed at villages, local organisations and local communities that address small-scale proj-
ects, usually no more than 10 million yen (approximately US$90,000). In Tonga most 
GGPs are used for water supply facilities, classroom construction and equipment and on 
average are US$21,000 each.
　　As the initiative for the grant comes from local communities and organisations, and 
the application process is relatively straightforward and fast, the GGPs have proven to be 
extremely popular. In addition, they provide an opportunity for Japan to engage with the 
people of a recipient country at the widest level. Groundbreaking and completion ceremo-
nies are usually attended by an embassy official and come with a signboard with the Japa-
nese flag and the legend ‘From the people of Japan’.
　　The GGPs have probably done more than anything to raise the image of Japan at the 
most basic level, undoubtedly giving a face to Japanese aid.
4.　Tentative Conclusions
　　Given that this is only the first part of a wider research project on Japanese ODA, 
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Notes
1 Most recently, revelations of JICA built wells in Laos costing 13 times as much as sim-
ilar wells by local construction companies under contract to a Japanese company (Daily 
Yomiuri, 2006a).  Bid-rigging of construction projects is also claimed to be “rampant” 
(Daily Yomiuri, 2006b).
2 Japan's whaling policy can be seen as arising from domestic politics, with nationalist 
groups overcoming liberal and business groups fearing international repercussions 
(BBC, 2006; Sato, 2001, pp.26-30).
3 Japan's delay in imposing sanctions on China after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 
1989 can be seen as gaiastu eventually overcoming domestic politics (Miyashita, 2001, 
pp.41-47).
4 Not without cause.  There is, for the second year running, a great deal of controversy 
surrounding the voting behaviour of the IWC delegate from the Solomon Islands and 
his relations with Japan (The Age, 2006b)
